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ABSTRACT: This paper provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between economic variables 
and sovereign risk premiums in the eurozone between the years 1988 and 2013. By using a Markov 
regime switching model it is possible to prove a nonlinear relationship. The result supports previous 
research, arguing that the market is observing economic variables to a larger degree during periods 
of financial instability. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the great financial crisis turned into a European sovereign debt crisis, the attention of southern 
Europe’s finances has significantly increased. The market fear of a sovereign default or a euro exit 
was immediate on the European government bond markets. After the euro introduction in 1999 the 
yield spread (using Germany as a benchmark) for many euro countries has increased from on average 
15 basis points to 2501 basis points during the year of financial instability. In the late 2011 it reached 
its peak with almost 650 basis points on average, which is a remarkable change from the long period 
of low spreads between 1996 and 2007. There are several explanations for the sudden convergence 
of the eurozone’s government bond yields prior to the euro introduction. Becker (2009) argues that 
the introduction of a single currency reduced the exchange rate risk as well as the inflation risk. 
Before that the yield spreads in Europe were largely driven by exchange rate fluctuations and 
inflation differentials towards Germany according to Manganelli et al (2007), especially in southern 
Europe with a history of high inflation and currency devaluations.  
With the reduced exchange rate risk and a more credible monetary policy in southern Europe, as 
argued by Becker (2009), the yield spreads decreased to almost zero all over the eurozone. Not until 
the financial crisis in 2007 did we see any significant divergence again. Although very small yield 
spreads during the first decade of the 2000s there were significantly increasing macroeconomic 
imbalances in terms of inflation, productivity and trade balance. The greatest imbalances were 
generally between southern Europe (including Ireland) and northern Europe, with the south as the 
weaker performing part in economic terms.  
According to classic portfolio theory these macroeconomic imbalances should have induced a higher 
risk premium among the southern countries, resulting in higher yields. This was not the situation and 
according to De Grauwe et al (2012) there was a systematic mispricing during 2001-2008. Therefore 
the market charged Germany and Greece similar risk premiums although great differences in macro 
fundamentals. A similar conclusion is made by Poghosyan (2012) in an analysis of the yield spreads in 
Europe during 1980-2010. He found that the actual risk premium before the financial crisis for the 
peripheral countries was lower than the estimated equilibrium (defined by macroeconomic 
fundamentals). The theory of mispricing after the euro introduction is confirmed by Bernoth et al 
(2012), finding that the importance of government debt after the euro introduction decreased. 
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 The averages are considering data from countries in our empirical study and the time periods 1999-2007 and 
2008-2013. 
3 
 
Not until the financial crisis in 2008 did the interest rates in the eurozone begin to diverge, finally 
leading to a severe spread for the peripheral countries during the sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012. 
A common argument, illustrated by De Grauwe et al (2012), is that the market mispricing and the low 
yield spread before the financial crisis created booms in the real estate market as well as in 
consumption. This led to macroeconomic instability, possibly explaining the increasing yield spread 
after the financial crisis. Another common explanation is the differing competitiveness between the 
south and the north, deteriorating southern Europe’s trade balance. Becker (2009) illustrates this by 
analyzing the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the countries. The REER has appreciated 
significantly for southern Europe including Ireland during the 2000s compared to northern Europe, 
explaining the country differences in competitiveness. 
As the market during and after the crisis began to differentiate between government bonds in 
Europe the yield spread for southern countries increased significantly. The worst situation was 
observed in Greece with a spread of almost 3000 basis points in early 2012. The spread in Italy and 
Spain reached at most around 450 and 500 basis points respectively. Empirical studies by Poghosyan 
(2012,) De Grauwe et al (2012) and Di Cesare et al (2012) shows that the yield spread for the 
peripheral countries after the financial crisis exceeded the estimated equilibrium. De Grauwe et al 
(2012) made a comparison between euro countries and non-euro countries. He found that euro 
countries were more penalized by the market, given their macroeconomic situation. De Grauwe et al 
argues that euro countries have no control over their own currency and therefore cannot guarantee 
that money always will be available, which non-euro countries can. This creates a risk of illiquidity 
which euro countries have to pay by a higher risk premium. Di Cesare et al discuss the risk of a euro 
break up as a possible explanation for the markets overestimation of the risk premium for the 
peripheral countries. 
Recent studies of the yield spread, further elaborated in the literature review below, has observed 
the periods before and after the financial crisis. A general conclusion is that the relationship between 
economic variables and the yield spread has changed during this period. This argues that the effects 
from variables are different depending on the economic situation, possibly explaining the mispricing 
showed by De Grauwe et al (2012). 
This nonlinearity of the European government bond market is further studied in this paper. The 
contribution to previous research is the investigation of different regimes on the eurozone bond 
market in 1988-2013. By simply observing the yield spreads (see Background) we can divide this 
period into three different states. One prior to the euro introduction with differing spreads among 
countries and relatively high volatility. This is followed by a period of a yield spreads close to zero for 
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the entire eurozone from the late 90s until the financial crisis. This period coincides well with the 
macroeconomic convergence prior to the euro introduction. The last period is the period during and 
after the financial crisis in which the yield spread again started to increase and diverge between 
countries. 
By using a Markov switching regime model it is possible to test if the period can be divided into 
different regimes statistically. The object is to see whether the relationship between sovereign risk 
premiums and economic variables are changing over time and thereby is nonlinear. But also if there 
was a certain regime during the period of low yield spread and if the market to a lower degree 
charged weak macro figures with a risk premium, implying a market mispricing as commonly argued 
in the literature. 
Data from six eurozone countries (Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and Spain), plus 
Germany as the benchmark country, is used. The data includes several macroeconomic variables and 
is collected from the years between 1988 and 2013. It provides a good possibility of analyzing the 
period before as well as after the euro introduction in 1999. 
The result shows that the nonlinearity is possible to prove for both Italy and Spain. Furthermore, the 
Markov switching regime model is able to observe a regime between the years 1996 and 2011, which 
coincides well with the period between the yield convergence prior to the euro introduction and the 
European sovereign debt crisis. The coefficients during this regime also show that the market to a 
smaller degree penalized countries for weakening macro figures in periods of financial stability. 
These results possibly support previous research arguing that there was a mispricing of the Spanish 
and Italian risk premiums during this period. For the other countries the model is not able to explain 
the yield spread on a satisfying level, neither economically nor statistically. A few explanations for 
this are further elaborated in the empirical analysis. 
The rest of the paper is disposed in the following way: Section 2 provides a brief summary of recent 
research while section 3 gives the background of the European yield spread during the years 1988-
2013. Section 4 analyzes the yield spread empirically. Here the model as well as the variables is 
explained and motivated. After that follows a description of the method as well as the data that is 
used in the empirical study. Finally the results are presented and analyzed. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review  
There is an increasing amount of research on the sovereign risk premium in order to explain the yield 
spreads in Europe. Especially since the convergence of the interest rates disappeared during the 
financial crisis and the spreads started to increase again. Many of these studies, focusing on the 
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situation in the eurozone, are using data from before the financial crisis in order to analyze the 
differences between a stable period and a period of financial instability.  
Recent research has found that the interest rate differentials in the eurozone can be explained by 
macroeconomic imbalances between the countries. Haugh et al (2009) shows that fiscal policies, 
especially their effect on future deficits and debt service, are important when explaining the yield 
spread in the eurozone. Bernoth et al (2010) finds that the government debt level is the consistently 
most important variable for the yield spread during the period 1999-2010. The importance of fiscal 
variables has also been proven by Matei et al (2013) as well as Schuknecht et al (2010). 
On the other hand, other results argue that the main determinant of the yield spread is the global 
risk aversion on the market and not fundamentals. Barrios et al (2009) finds that the importance of 
an international factor such as general risk perception overrides fundamental variables. Similar 
results are found by Manganelli et al (2009), although the risk factor in turn can be affected by 
fundamental variables. 
Empirical research shows that the effects from macroeconomic variables are significantly larger 
during financial instability relative to more stable periods. Several studies, comparing the situation 
before and after the financial crisis, have proven this difference, suggesting nonlinearity. Assman et 
al (2011) and Bernoth et al (2010) estimates time varying coefficients in a panel model framework, 
both finding that market reactions on fiscal variables increased significantly during and after the 
financial crisis in 2007.  Bernoth et al (2010) results shows that in the early years of the euro the 
interest differentials were mainly explained by the debt level and investors risk aversion. At the 
second half of the 2000s, before the crisis, Germany’s safe-haven status increased, signaling that the 
market’s risk aversion increased years before the actual crisis. After the crisis, effects from 
government fiscal loosening increased. Assman et al (2011) found that the importance, and the sign, 
of the determinants changed dramatically during the sample period 2001-2010, particularly during 
the crisis but also before. The debt-to-GDP variable is generally the most important. The variables for 
budget balance and outstanding debt securities are insignificant between 2003 and 2007, while both 
gained importance and explanatory power during the crisis. 
Arghyrou et al (2011) confirms the hypothesis of different market reactions depending on the 
economic situation, as coefficients gained both economic and statistical power during the crisis 
period compared to the pre-crisis period. Arghyrou et al argues that between 1999 and 2007 the 
effects from macro fundamentals and the international risk factor was negligible, possibly with the 
exception of the expected fiscal deficit. The behavior of the market changed significantly during the 
crisis as both the international risk factor as well as macro fundamentals had a significant effect on 
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the yield spreads. Similar results are found by Schuknecht et al (2010). The coefficients for budget 
deficits are 3-4 times higher after the Lehmann Brother default, and for debt 7-8 times higher. 
In a study over long term determinants by Alfonso el al (2012), using data between 1973 and 2008, 
macroeconomic variables are found to be insignificant in general and unable to explain the 
development of the spread before the crisis. This result changed after the summer 2007, arguing that 
the market’s observation of fundamental variables in Europe increased after the crisis. 
3. Background 
The spread of the government bond yield (using Germany as benchmark) from 1988 until 2013 for 
the countries in our dataset is illustrated in Figure 1. Between 1988 and 1997 there was a large 
volatility in the spread, especially for Greece, Italy and Spain and to some degree France. The 
recession in the early 90s is illustrated by a higher spread for these countries. During this period 
investors preferred safe assets such as German bonds, resulting in a decrease for the German 
interest rate. At the same time investors avoided more risky bonds, explaining the significant 
increase of the spread. A similar increase of the spread is observable during 1995, explained by the 
necessary adjustment to the euro and a common exchange rate. This adoption was clearly greatest 
for Italy and Spain as their currencies diverged significantly from the euro average during the 90s, 
following several devaluations (Sevilla, 1995).  The Greek adjustment occurred later as they joined 
the third stage of the EMU in 2001. 
Figure 1. Yield spread against German government bonds (in percentage points) 
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From 1988 until the late 90s there were significant macroeconomic imbalances, particularly in terms 
of inflation but also current account and budget deficit. In order to join the EMU, the countries had 
to fulfill the euro convergence criteria from the Maastricht Treaty. The purpose of the criteria is to 
achieve price stability in the eurozone and observes inflation, government budget deficits, 
government debt, exchange rate and long term interest rate (10y government bonds). This forced 
countries to correct imbalances prior to the euro introduction in 1999 and led to macroeconomic 
convergence. It was achievable partly because of a global economic growth during this period. This 
convergence is observable in Figure 1 already in 1996 for all countries except Greece because of their 
later introduction. From 1998 until the financial crisis in 2007, excluding Greece, none of the 
countries in our dataset had a higher yield spread than 40 basis points. The same thing can be said 
for Greece after their introduction in 2001. This is a remarkable change compared with the situation 
before the euro. During that period Greece had an average of more than 400 basis points while Spain 
and Italy had more than 350 basis points on average (see Table 1 below). 
For the countries in our dataset the average spread between 2001 and the financial crisis in 2007 was 
around 15 basis points. During this period there was in general economic growth and low volatility on 
the financial market, giving governments the possibility to improve their public finances. The 
exceptionally low yield spread, however, gave no incentives for countries to do this. When large and 
influential euro countries (Germany and France) ignored the Maastricht criteria of a budget deficit of 
no more than 3 percent of GDP it further deteriorated the ambitions of a balanced budget2. What 
was later discovered is that the Greek public finances had been incorrectly measured and overly 
positive. According to the new figures, Greece had a budget deficit of more than 3 percent when 
they introduced the euro (Göttsche et al, 2011). The criteria from the Maastricht treaty were thereby 
never met. 
The macroeconomic convergence in the eurozone from the early 2000s would however disappear 
and again give a situation of increasing imbalances. These imbalances were especially large in terms 
of current account, reflecting differing productivity between the north and the south. A common 
explanation is the introduction of a single currency, forcing southern Europe to compete with the 
more productive north using the same currency (Becker et al, 2009). Before the euro it was possible 
to compensate for the lack of competitiveness by currency devaluation, which southern Europe had 
done repeatedly. This was no longer possible. The effect in northern Europe was the opposite as they 
now had an exchange rate less valued than it would have been outside the EMU. This had, and 
continues to have, a positive effect on their trade. Especially the German economy, driven by export, 
                                                          
2
 Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-09/european-crisis-timeline-from-maastricht-treaty-
to-fiscal-union-agreement.html (accessed 2014-03-29). 
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has gained greatly on the low exchange rate according to Thorbecke et al (2012). These imbalances, 
however, are not reflected in the yield spread as it was before the euro. This can be used as an 
argument for market mispricing during this period, as proposed by De Grauwe et al (2012). Another 
is the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s which led to significant global financial instability but had no 
effect on the yield spread in the eurozone. 
In 2008, during the financial crisis, the spread began to increase again, reaching its highest values 
since the 90s. The financial crises led to increasing public spending as the banking sector needed 
immediate support and because of higher unemployment.  The countries with the weakest 
macroeconomic variables (Italy, Spain and Greece) had their yield spread increasing. During 2011 and 
2012 the debt level as well as the budget deficit for the peripheral countries had reached 
unsustainable levels, leading to market fears of a euro breakup or a euro exit for specific countries. 
As a result the yield spread increased significantly for the peripheral countries, reaching almost 3000 
basis points for Greece. After local reforms and austerity measures increasing the credibility of the 
government’s fiscal policy the yield began to decrease in 2012. Furthermore, in august 2012 ECB 
announced the ‘Outright Monetary Transaction’ (OMT), giving the possibility for ECB to make 
purchases on the secondary, sovereign bond market. The aim of the OMT was to lower the 
borrowing cost for the crisis countries by bringing down bond yields. 
The eurozone yield spread between 1988 and 2013 can be divided into three phases. One period 
before the euro introduction with relatively high yield spread volatility and an average spread of 200 
basis points for our countries. This was followed by a period between the euro introductions and the 
financial crisis, between 1999 and 2007, when the average yield spread was 15 basis points. The last 
phase is between 2008 and 2013, dominated by the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt 
crisis. During this period the average spread was 250 basis points. 
Table 1. Average yield spreads against German bonds in basis points 
 France Italy Greece Austria Netherlands Spain Total 
1988-1998 81 395 419* 16 5 365 214 
1999-2007 7 24 28** 11 7 11 15 
2008-2013 53 204 945 55 33 209 250 
Source: Thomson Reuter Datastream 
* Greece join the EMU in 2001, therefore data from 1988-2000 
** Data from 2001-2007 
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4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Model 
In theory, according to Manganelli et al (2009), the spread between two assets should be zero if the 
risk-return characteristics are the same. If that is not true, the riskier assets return will include a risk 
premium, i.e. the spread. The definition of risk premium is the return in excess of the risk free rate 
that the investor is expected to earn on an investment. The risk premium is simply a compensation 
for the extra risk, compared to the risk free asset, of the investment. This comply well with the classic 
portfolio theory (Den Butter et al, 2004), asserting that the differences in asset prices is caused by 
differences in risk, assuming that investors are risk averse and only willing to invest in higher risk if 
compensated. The risk is determined by the probability that the investor will not receive his full 
investment and interest back. In the literature, that probability is commonly explained by the 
exchange rate risk and the credit risk, including several macroeconomic variables.3 
The risk premium is not only determined by the investor’s probability of not receiving full investment 
with interest back, but also the variance of it. This is reflected by a global risk factor according to 
Schuknech et al (2010), which is depending on the current state of the global economy. This gives the 
following model for the risk premium: 
     
                     , 
where credit risk      includes fiscal variables such as government debt, budget balance, current 
account, GDP growth and unemployment. The dependent variable      
  denotes the government 
bond yield spread with Germany as benchmark.     denotes exchange rate risk and     denotes 
the global risk factor. The variables are further explained in the data section below. 
Credit risk describes the risk of losing money because of insolvency of the issuer. A relatively recent 
example is the sovereign default of Argentina 2001 when a large share of the public debt was 
defaulted. For government bonds, credit risk describes the risk of a (partial) sovereign default which 
is commonly described by government debt and budget balance. A sovereign default is usually a 
result of an unsustainable debt meaning a higher debt should increase the probability of default and 
therefore increase the spread as investors requires a premium for lending. De Grauwe et al (2012) 
analyzes the relationship between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the yield spread in the eurozone and 
finds a significant relationship, although it is unable to explain the entire spread. 
                                                          
3
 A third variable commonly used, especially when observing shorter periods with higher frequency, is liquidity. 
A good proxy for liquidity was however not possible to find for our time period. 
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The budget balance of a country has a direct effect on the debt level as well as the debt sustainability 
and imposes a strong indication of the government’s control over the current financial situation 
according to Costantini et al (2013). A country with a low debt level but with a budget deficit for 
several years may be charged with a risk premium by the market. The deficit can be regarded as a 
sign of structural problems for the economy that will impose future debt problems. A budget surplus, 
on the other hand, should eventually reduce the debt and therefore have a decreasing effect on the 
spread. Assman et al (2011), however, argues that the budget balance can have a positive 
relationship with the spread in certain situations. Therefore, a budget deficit may decrease the 
spread given that it is perceived to create long term sustainable investments that will lead to future 
growth. The budget balance is widely used in the literature as a variable for credit risk, e.g. by 
Schuknecht et al (2010) and Alfono et al (2012). Both debt and budget balance are included in the 
Maastricht Treaty to assess sovereign fiscal soundness. 
A country’s ability to fulfill future long term foreign obligations can be explained by several 
macroeconomic variables, such as current account, GDP growth and unemployment. The expected 
ability to fulfill these obligations should, ceteris peribus, have a negative relationship with the yield 
spread. An increase in e.g. current account balance can be interpreted as a sign of higher productivity 
which will improve the ability to fulfill foreign obligations. According to De Grauwe (2012), a deficit 
should be interpreted as an increase in net foreign debt of the country as a whole. Also, a positive 
current account implies that a country can accumulate high additional savings which will strengthen 
the financial condition in the long term. Assman et al (2011), however, argues that the current 
account can have a positive effect on the spread in certain situation. The argument is similar to that 
for the budget balance. If the current account deficit is perceived to create investments that will lead 
to future growth it may have a positive relationship with the yield spread. 
GDP growth is commonly used as a variable for the current state in the economy. According to 
Poghosyan (2012) it is one of two long term determinants of the bond yield, the other one being 
government debt. Matei et al (2013) is able to show a negative relationship between GDP growth 
and the yield spread, i.e. an increasing GDP reduces the yield spread. In the long run employment can 
have a similar effect on the yield spread. An increasing unemployment rate for a longer period can be 
an indicator of economic stagnation but will also have a negative effect on the budget balance. It is 
shown to have a positive effect on the yield spread by Bengoechea et al (2012) and Chionis et al 
(2013). 
Exchange rate risk is the risk of investing in a country with a different currency, as return also 
depends on exchange rate developments. If the investment is made in foreign currency and a 
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depreciation of the foreign currency takes place compared to the domestic currency it will decrease 
the return. If the investment on the other hand is made in domestic currency and the foreign 
currency depreciates, the issuer may not be able to repay the debt, increasing risk of insolvency 
(Beber, 2012). Exchange rate risk also consists of inflation risk and the credibility of monetary policy. 
Afonso (2010) argues that a high inflation can be a sign of the government’s intentions of partially 
inflate away its fiscal indebtedness, resulting in higher yield. Another argument, highlighted by Matei 
et al (2013), is that higher price differentials lead to an international loss in competitiveness. 
Furthermore, a low inflation is normally associated with a low nominal interest rate, creating 
incentives to borrow and lending at long maturities. That, in turn, stimulates investments and 
growth, reducing the yield spread. If interest rates are high, investors’ incentives to borrow and 
invest in riskier assets are reduced. According to Manganelli et al (2007) the risk of inflation is even 
more severe among highly indebted countries as their government may be forced to reduce the real 
debt value by creating higher inflation. This acting may further deteriorate the credibility of 
monetary policy, increasing the spread. 
The international risk aversion is typically measured by stock market volatility or the spread between 
government bonds and corporate bonds, creating a common risk factor. As the risk factor increases, 
implying financial instability, investors risk aversion increases as well as the demand for safe assets. 
Therefore the risk factor can have different effects on different assets. Government bonds, in 
general, should benefit in times of financial turmoil as they are regarded less risky than other asset 
classes according to Barrios et al (2009). During the sovereign debt crisis however, the reason for the 
financial instability was the risk of a sovereign default among some of the peripheral countries. 
Alexopouplou et al (2009) argues that the magnitude of the risk is important for government bonds. 
A small increase in risk aversion may result in a general decrease of government bond yields as this 
asset class is considered relatively safe. But a large increase in risk aversion will only benefit the 
safest bonds. Government bonds issued by e.g. Germany, US or Japan are considered safe and the 
demand for these usually increase in times of financial instability. 
The importance of risk aversion is highlighted by Hague et al (2009), especially during periods of 
financial turmoil. When the risk aversion increases investors move from risky to safe and more liquid 
assets. As the demand for safe assets increases, the yield for them will decrease while increasing for 
risky assets, resulting in a larger yield spread between risky and safe assets. During times of stability 
investors prefer assets with higher earnings and are less concerned about risk. The risk factor can 
override other factors and result in exaggerated yield fluctuations. This is illustrated by Alfonso et al 
(2012). 
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4.2 Methodology 
Previous studies on the government bond market have found that the effects from macroeconomic 
variables on the government bond spreads are differing when comparing the pre-financial crisis 
period with the crisis period. This confirms Lucas’ (1976) important research on the relationship 
between macroeconomic variables, arguing that it is changing over time (‘The Lucas critique’). These 
changes can come from e.g. recessions and expansions, following the business cycle. Sometimes it 
can be explained by structural breaks but sometimes these changes persist for a certain period of 
time, instead of short-lived jumps. There are several econometric models that can investigate these 
possible events.  
The most simple, used by Arghyrou et al (2011), is to estimate two different regressions during two 
different periods. By comparing the results it is possible to find changes in the relationship between 
variables, but the loss of information from dividing the data into different regressions makes this 
approach less attractive. Another possibility, commonly used when suspecting nonlinearity, is to 
include squared variables. Barrios et al (2009) estimates a model of the yield spreads in the eurozone 
and adds a squared-debt variable. It was found that the effect of an accelerating debt is an even 
further increasing spread.  
Another approach that can be used when the researcher is interested in differences between periods 
is to add dummy variables. Schuknecht et al (2010) used this method by including a dummy variable 
for the financial crisis period.  It is then possible to compare the pre-crisis period with the crisis 
period, and analyze how the variables are changing between different economic periods.  
Although these methods can be used to observe changes in the economy they are all linear. In an 
economy with constant changes, such as recessions and expansion, that is not appropriate since 
previous research showed that the importance of macro fundamentals is changing. Therefore a 
nonlinear model should perform better estimates. One of these approaches is to estimate time 
varying coefficients, as proposed by Assman et al (2011) and Bernoth et al (2010). Bernoth et al 
argues that time-varying coefficients can observe how changes in the yield spread is due to changes 
in macro variables, and to what extent it reflects the markets’ pricing of these variables.  
In our study we are interested in the nonlinearity of yield spread determinants and specifically the 
possible differences between the low spread period around 1999-2008 and the high spread periods 
before and after. An approach for this is the estimation of a regime shifting model, commonly used in 
the research field of finance. The regime shifting models are appealing when conducting estimations 
in a nonlinear context with suspicions of changes in the economy or any other type of seasonality.  
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If these changes or shifts are known, a deterministic regime shifting model with dummy variables can 
be used. For this paper, however, a Markov switching regime model is used in which the states are 
unobserved, i.e. the yield spread can change stochastically from regime to regime. This is the 
strength of the model, compared to other models. Instead of having to determine the shifts before 
the estimation, the Markov switching model is able to capture these changes. By using this method, 
the model will provide probabilities of being in a certain regime and different coefficients for the 
regimes. A brief description of the model will be provided below, for a detailed explanation of the 
Markov switching model see Hamilton (1989). 
In the Markov switching model the time series is divided into n periods, denoted             The 
dependent variables,   , switches regime according to the unobserved variables   . Assuming a two 
state model      means the process is in regime 1 at time  , while      means the process is in 
regime 2 at time  . The shifts between the regimes depend on a Markov process: 
        |                      |     , 
which states that the probability distribution of the state at time   depends only on the state at   
 . Hamilton’s model, more known as ‘Hamilton’s filter’, comprises an unobserved state variable,   . It 
is assumed to evaluate according to a first order Markov process: 
         |            
         |              
         |            
         |               
where e.g.     denotes the probability of being in regime 1, given that the system was in regime 1 
the previous period. Therefore       denotes the probability of    changing from state 1 in period 
    to state 2 in period  . Given these specifications,    evolves as the following AR(1) process: 
                   , 
where            . Under these conditions    can be viewed as a dummy variable for shifts in 
the series discussed above. In this framework the following model is given: 
           √   
        , 
where    denotes the yield spread and          .  In state 1 the expected values and variances of 
the series are    and   
  respectively, while in state 2         and    
     respectivelly. The 
variances in state 2 are defined   
    
   . The unknown parameters          
    
           
are estimated by maximum likelihood and an algorithm proposed by Hamilton (1989). 
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By using the current periods probability and a set of transition probabilities is it possible to forecast 
the regime probabilities for a two-state model, given the variables follows a Markov process. For a 
two state model the transition probabilities can be expressed by the matrix 
  [
      
      
] . 
4.3 Data 
The empirical analysis covers the eurozone’s economic development between the years 1988 and 
2013. By using data from this period it is possible to analyze the period before as well as after the 
euro introduction, including the financial instability since 2007. The explanatory variables consist 
primarily of forecast data from the semiannual OECD World Economic Outlook instead of current 
data. Since the financial market always is forward looking, forecast data is preferred over past or 
current data when modelling risk premiums. Unfortunately OECD had no forecasts for Ireland and 
Portugal during the 80s and therefore had to be excluded, although a study of them would have been 
interesting. The actual data is quarterly and collected from Thomson Reuter Datastream. With a few 
exceptions (real effective exchange rate and risk factor) the data uses Germany as a benchmark 
country. A detailed description can be found in Appendix. 
The dependent variable is the 10 year government bond yield differentiated by the German yield. 
German data from before the reunification in 1990 is data from West Germany. The yield spread is 
further explained and illustrated in Background above. 
All of the credit risk variables are OECD forecasts, except for the government debt-to-GDP ratio 
which is actual data. Since OECD only conduct forecasts twice a year and our empirical analysis uses a 
quarterly frequency the forecast data had to be interpolated by the previous value. This simply 
means that for quarter 2 and 4, the forecast data from quarter 1 and 3 is used. The forecast is always 
for the following year. The government debt, budget balance and current account are ratios of GDP. 
The GDP growth measures the change in GDP from previous year, while the unemployment is local 
estimates and may therefore slightly differ in method from country to country. 
The debt-to-GDP is actual data and during 1988-2013 there is a general increase as illustrated in 
Figure 2. Increases have mainly occurred during two periods: the recession in the early 90s and after 
the financial crisis in 2007. The large increases for southern Europe since the financial crisis can to 
some degree be explained by a slow or negative growth, further deteriorating the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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Figure 2. Government debt (% GDP) 
Source: Thomson Reuter Datastream 
  
One possible explanation for the increasing debt level is the budget balance. As illustrated in Figure 3 
the budget balances have been negative most of the years between 1988 and 2013 in Europe. For a 
few countries it has in fact been negative for all these years. The Greek debt level is not surprising 
when considering their budget deficit. 
Figure 3. Expected budget balance (% GDP) 
Source: OECD World Economic Outlook 
  
The OECD’s current account measures the economic transactions of a country with the rest of the 
world during a specific time period. The transactions include goods, services, income and transfers. It 
is seasonally adjusted and relative to GDP.  When observing the current account balance in Figure 4 
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there is a clear division between the north and the south. The northern countries’ current account 
balance has in general been positive while negative for the south. France is normally considered a 
northern country in these economic comparisons but their current account has fluctuated around 
zero. For the last ten years their current account has been a deficit.  
Figure 4. Expected current account (% GDP) 
Source: OECD World Economic Outlook 
  
The real effective exchange rate (REER) is used in our empirical analysis as a proxy for the exchange 
rate risk. REER describes the strength of a currency relative to a basket of trade-weighted currencies. 
It is therefore a good measure of both the exchange rate risk and international competitiveness. 
Figure 5 illustrates the log REER and shows the convergence of the exchange rate prior to the euro 
introduction. It also shows the significantly larger currency appreciation of the peripheral countries 
compared to the northern countries between the euro introduction and the financial crisis. This gives 
a good picture of the potential differences in competitiveness within the eurozone and the increasing 
imbalances between the north and the south. 
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Figure 5. Real effective exchange rate (in logarithms) 
Source: OECD World Economic Outlook 
 
The inflation variable in the empirical analysis is the OECD forecast of the private consumption 
deflator. Similar to the previous variables there was a clear convergence of the inflation at the end of 
the 90s. Before that, southern Europe had struggled with a high and volatile inflation. Since the 
inflation was a part of the convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, a reduction of inflation was 
necessary for many countries. After the euro introduction the inflation in southern Europe increased 
again, although it did not reach the same levels as during the 80s and early 90s. After the financial 
crisis, around 2009, the inflation rate decreased significantly in the entire eurozone.  
Figure 6. Expected inflation 
Source: OECD World Economic Outlook 
 
The global risk variable is the quarterly difference between US government bonds and US corporate 
bonds. The US corporate bonds are Moody’s Baa corporate bonds. The German government bond 
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yield and its relationship with our international risk variable are illustrated in figure 7, showing a 
negative relationship (especially before the euro). This is evidence of its safe haven status, which 
further increases the spreads for the southern countries. As the German yield decreases during times 
of financial instability, it moves in opposite direction in southern Europe. The risk variable clearly 
shows the market reactions from previous periods of financial instability. There is an increasing 
volatility during the early 90s recession, although the level is not very high. The turmoil on the 
world’s stock markets during the internet crash in the early 2000s is also observable. Finally there is 
an increased level during the financial crisis as well as the sovereign debt crisis. 
 Figure 7. Global risk factor and German government bond yield 
Source: Thomson Reuter Datastream and Moody’s 
  
4.4 Empirical results and analysis 
Spain 
The tests for regimes are conducted by comparing a simple OLS regression with a Markov regime 
switching model. When comparing the AIC and BIC it is possible to conclude that a model with 2 
regimes estimates the Spanish yield spread most efficiently. The OLS regressions for each country are 
presented in Appendix below. 
The switching regime model with two regimes for Spain is able to observe a steady regime (regime 2) 
between late 1996 and early 2010. This is the period of very low yield spread and confirms our 
hypothesis of a certain regime during these years. Except for a few years in the early 2000s, this 
period is considered financially stable with a relatively high growth. This also holds for Spain’s 
economy, although a constant trade deficit and decreasing productivity compared to northern euro 
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countries. Instead, during this period the country’s growth was mainly driven by investments in the 
real estate market which had an increasing effect on the inflation. 
Figure 8. Regime probabilities for Spain 
 
The figure describes the probability of being in regime 1 and 2 (S(t)=1 and S(t)=2), respectively. 
The period before regime 2 has rather fluctuating regime probabilities which are not very surprising 
since the Spanish yield spread also fluctuated heavily during this period. In the late 80s and the early 
90s the Spanish yield spread was even higher, or at similar level, as during the sovereign debt crisis 
2011-2012. During the global recession between 1989 and 1992 Spain suffered from slow growth, 
budget deficits, high inflation and a swelling unemployment close to 20 percent in 1994. But before 
the euro launch the global economy was in a much better state and they managed to improve their 
growth and reach a satisfying inflation level to fulfill the requirements from the Maastricht treaty. 
This resulted in a decreasing yield spread. 
Regime 1 also captures the years 2010-2012 when the European sovereign debt crisis reached its 
most turmoil period. During these years the Spanish government announces two austerity measures 
of 15bn euro and 16.5bn euro respectively. In June 2012 the government formally requested 
assistance from the eurozone to bail out its banking sector.4 Furthermore, in August 2012 the 
autonomous region Catalonia (Spain’s largest region in terms of GDP 2010) requested a 5bn euro 
bailout from the central government. Also, during this period Spain’s credit ratings were cut several 
times. As the sovereign debt crisis in 2013 left its most critical phase, with a decreasing yield spread 
as a results, the regime probability turned back to regime 2 again.  
 
                                                          
4
 BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17955805 (accessed 2014-04-01). 
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Table 2. Government bond yield spread against Germany 
 Spain  Italy  
 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 
Debt -0.020 
(0.048) 
-0.053*** 
(0.020) 
-0.142*** 
(0.048) 
0.121*** 
(0.014) 
Budget balance -0.395*** 
(0.119) 
-0.262*** 
(0.071) 
-0.642*** 
(0.069) 
-0.293*** 
(0.035) 
Current account -0.064 
(0.045) 
0.005 
(0.037) 
0.257*** 
(0.071) 
-0.141*** 
(0.024) 
Inflation 1.309*** 
(0.154) 
0.621*** 
(0.144) 
-0.255** 
(0.141) 
0.654*** 
(0.124) 
GDP growth 0.847*** 
(0.163) 
0.924*** 
(0.146) 
-0.656*** 
(0.188) 
-0.204 
(0.175) 
Unemployment 
 
0.387*** 
(0.101) 
0.339*** 
(0.049) 
-0.243*** 
(0.080) 
0.217*** 
(0.031) 
Real eff. exchange rate -0.734*** 
(0.239) 
-0.591*** 
(0.118) 
2.168*** 
(0.687) 
-1.832*** 
(0.206) 
Risk factor 1.244 
(0.762) 
0.392 
(0.242) 
3.366*** 
(0.662) 
0.473**  
(0.215) 
Observations 104  104  
Akaike info criteria 2.004  1.499  
Schwarz criterion 2.487  1.982  
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The estimated coefficients are to a high degree expected when it comes to the signs. They are in 
general smaller during the low spread period which implies that the market was less observant on 
macro fundamentals during this period. This can be interpreted as a market mispricing, highlighted 
by De Grauwe et al (2012). The variable for the current account is insignificant in both regimes. This 
implies the market’s ignorance of this variable, especially during the low yield spread period when 
the current accounts never showed positive numbers. The risk variables are also insignificant and do 
not seem to have any effect on the Spanish yield spread. Debt is only significant in regime 2 and has 
an unexpected sign, contradicting theories that a higher debt should increase the spread. Compared 
to the other peripheral countries, however, the government debt has not been the focus of the 
Spanish problems. That has rather been the struggling banking sector, which can explain these 
results.  
As the regime probability illustrates the two longest periods of regime 1 are coinciding with periods 
of slow global growth or recessions. During regime 1 all significant coefficients except GDP (which 
only has a small change) have higher absolute values, implying that the market to a higher degree is 
observing country-specific macro variables during periods of global financial unrest. This confirms 
previous research. 
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Italy 
The regime probabilities for Italy are very similar to those of Spain with one regime during the low 
yield spread period and one during the periods of higher spread. Regime 2 coincides fairly well with 
the period between the euro introduction and the European sovereign debt crisis. The time period 
before 1997 is, similar to Spain, fluctuating between the two regimes but dominated by regime 1. 
From the start of our dataset in 1988 until the mid-90s Italy suffered from a slow or negative growth, 
increasing government debt, high unemployment as well as inflation, trade deficit and a large budget 
deficit. This situation forced Italian governments to large privatizations, reformations and public 
spending cuts. In September 1992 the central bank had to devaluate the Italian lire by 7 percent. 
Later on Italy was forced to exit the European currency system ERM (European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism), mainly because of high German interest rates which created an appreciating drive on 
the entire ERM (Sevilla, 1995).  
Figure 9. Regime probabilities for Italy 
 
The figure describes the probability of being in regime 1 and 2 (S(t)=1 and S(t)=2), respectively. 
After the currency devaluation and the political reforms Italy improved its economy by the end of the 
90s which was required for them to introduce the euro in 1999. From the euro introduction until the 
financial crisis the Italian economy had a growth rate in line with the EU average and a decreasing 
(yet high) unemployment. The trade surplus from the second half of the 90s, however, turned into a 
deficit in 2000 and continued to increase until the financial crisis as the Italian productivity was falling 
behind the northern countries.  
Regime 1 also includes the most turmoil years of the sovereign debt crisis 2011-2013, when the 
Italian yield spread also reached its peak. During this period the confidence of the Italian economy 
was very low and much of the attention was given to the high government debt and the bad politics 
from Prime Minister Berlusconi which later forced him to resign in November 2011. Mr. Berlusconi 
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was replaced by the former EU commissioner Mario Monti who formed a technocrat government. 
The new government immediately started to tackle the financial issues by severe austerity measures 
according to EU’s recommendations. This is reflected on the bond market as the yield spread 
immediately falls from 750 to 670 basis points. By 2013 the yield spread was less than 300 points 
which also coincides with the transition back to regime 2 in the regime switching model and an end 
to the most alarming phase of the sovereign debt crisis. 5 
During regime 2 the estimated coefficients have the expected signs and are significant with the 
exception of GDP. Similar to the results for Spain the variables in regime 1 are in general higher, 
confirming that macro variables are more observed by the market during periods of financial 
instability. In regime 1 the signs for debt, current account and unemployment are not corresponding 
to previous studies. This could be interpreted as the yield spread not being driven by macro 
fundamentals during this period. Instead the parameter for risk is significantly larger for regime 1 
than regime 2, implying that global risk aversion was more important for the yield spread than macro 
variables during this phase.  
France 
The French regime probabilities are similar to Italy’s and Spain’s with a long, almost continuous 
regime from 1996 to 2011 (regime 2). The time before and after are fluctuating between regime 1 
and 2. The first three years belong to regime 2, as well as few years in the mid-90s and a short period 
between 2011 and 2012. Regime 2, between the years 1996 and 2011, coincides with the period of 
low yield spread, similar to Spain and Italy. By the time of the financial crisis, the probabilities for 
regime 2 started to fluctuate, although still at a high level, and finally change to regime 1 during the 
worst part of the sovereign debt crisis. As the French yield spread decreased from its highest levels 
during the end of 2012, there was a shift back to regime 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 BBC. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17435616 (accessed 2014-03-14). 
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Figure 10. Regime probabilities for France 
 
The figure describes the probability of being in regime 1 and 2 (S(t)=1 and S(t)=2), respectively. 
Until the euro introduction, the French economy generally followed the northern European average. 
For some macroeconomic variables, such as current account and GDP growth, they were e.g. 
outperforming Germany on average. Part of the explanation is possibly the German reunification that 
required several years of adjustments, resulting in deteriorated macro figures. Regardless of the 
relatively strong French performance during the 90s, France had a jump in the yield spread between 
the end of 1994 and beginning of 1996. During this period the spread reached the same level as 
during the sovereign debt crisis, although the later spread was mainly a result of a low German 
interest rate as investors fled to safe assets. 
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Table 3. Government bond yield spread against Germany 
 France  Greece  
 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 
Debt 0.052*** 
(0.011) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.491 
(0.139) 
0.061 
(0.022) 
Budget balance 0.920*** 
(0.098) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
-0.496 
(0.542) 
-0.213 
(0.091) 
Current account 0.186*** 
(0.034) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
4.115 
(2.101) 
0.051 
(0.041) 
Inflation 0.951*** 
(0.101) 
-0.075 
(0.057) 
-1.656 
(1.095) 
-0.157 
(0.115) 
GDP growth -0.017 
(0.195) 
-0.341*** 
(0.115) 
-3.911 
(3.669) 
-1.025 
(0.196) 
Unemployment 
 
0.169 
(0.119) 
0.094*** 
(0.023) 
-2.689 
(1.338) 
-0.040 
(0.058) 
Real eff. exchange rate 0.360*** 
(0.096) 
0.000 
(0.015) 
7.999 
(3.874) 
-0.036 
(0.272) 
Risk factor 0.702** 
(0.300) 
0.371*** 
(0.087) 
9.800 
(4.912) 
0.136 
(0.847) 
Observations 104  104  
Akaike info criteria 0.140  4.175  
Schwarz criterion 0.623  4.658  
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
During regime 2 the coefficients are generally lower in absolute values and many are insignificant. 
Only debt, GDP, unemployment and the risk factor are significant at 1 percent level.  The current 
account is significant at 10 percent level. All of these variables have the expected signs except debt 
which has a negative relationship with yield spread, which contradicts theory. For regime 1, only GDP 
and unemployment is insignificant. However, both current account and budget have unexpected 
signs. The only variables that are significant in both regimes are debt and risk. The negative sign for 
debt during the low spread period (and relatively smaller absolute value) and the positive sign in the 
other period can be interpreted as the market’s ignorance of the sovereign debt situation during this 
period. The risk factor variable is significantly larger in regime 1. 
Although the regime probabilities to a large extent confirm the hypothesis and are similar to those of 
Spain and Italy, the model is generally not explaining the yield spread for France very well since many 
variables are either insignificant or contradicts economic theory and previous research. 
Greece 
In Greece the effects from the financial crisis have been the worst among the euro countries. The 
yield spread increased significantly with a maximum at almost 3000 basis points in the beginning of 
2012. Only two years earlier the spread was 300 basis points, and during a large part of the 2000s the 
spread was close to zero and in line with the rest of the eurozone. The model is unfortunately not 
able to estimate these volatilities very well. The best results are given with a Markov 3 regime 
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switching model although the differences from the 2 regime model are small. In order to be 
consistent the 2 regime model is presented in Table 3 while the 3 regime model can be found in the 
appendix. In the 2 regime model, the regime probabilities seems to capture the two high spread 
periods during the end of the 80s and during the sovereign debt crisis. The rest of the period is 
dominated by regime 2. 
Figure 11. Regime probabilities for Greece 
The figure describes the probability of being in regime 1 and 2 (S(t)=1 and S(t)=2), respectively. 
The estimated coefficients are to a large degree insignificant. The only variable that is significant in 
both periods, in the 2 regime model, is the debt variables. It has a positive sign in both regimes, 
confirming previous result of having an increasing effect on the spread. All these results, however, 
must be analyzed with great caution.  
The models inability in explaining the Greek yield spread is not a big surprise. The fact that Greece 
has been unable to borrow on the international market has driven the yield spread to extreme levels 
(Gibson et al, 2012). Also, Greece’s falsely reported macro statistics during the 2000s further explains 
why the Greek yield spread is an extraordinary case differing from other in the eurozone.   
Austria and Netherlands 
Among the countries in our empirical analysis, Austria and Netherlands have had the lowest yield 
spread against Germany. On average, the quarterly yield spreads during 1988-2013 have been less 
than 25 and 15 basis points respectively. The obvious explanation for this is the macroeconomic 
similarities. Austria and Netherlands have in general performed significantly better macroeconomic 
figures compared to southern Europe. Similar to Germany they have gained international 
competitiveness from the low valued euro, as the real effective exchange rate has showed. 
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Figure 12. Regime probabilities for Austria 
 
The figure describes the probability of being in regime 1 and 2 (S(t)=1 and S(t)=2), respectively. 
 
Figure 13. Regime probabilities for Netherlands 
 
The figure describes the probability of being in regime 1 and 2 (S(t)=1 and S(t)=2), respectively. 
Since the risk premiums for these two countries have been almost zero during 1988-2013, the 
models failure to make a satisfying estimation is not surprising. Both Austria’s and Netherlands’ 
regime probabilities are hard to explain against the economic reality in Europe, both by a linear OLS 
model as well as a Markov switching model. The Markov switching model with 2 regimes estimates a 
slightly better model however, implying that the relationship between the yield spreads and macro 
fundamentals is nonlinear. This further confirms previous research. 
 
 
 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Q
1
 1
9
8
8
Q
1
 1
9
8
9
Q
1
 1
9
9
0
Q
1
 1
9
9
1
Q
1
 1
9
9
2
Q
1
 1
9
9
3
Q
1
 1
9
9
4
Q
1
 1
9
9
5
Q
1
 1
9
9
6
Q
1
 1
9
9
7
Q
1
 1
9
9
8
Q
1
 1
9
9
9
Q
1
 2
0
0
0
Q
1
 2
0
0
1
Q
1
 2
0
0
2
Q
1
 2
0
0
3
Q
1
 2
0
0
4
Q
1
 2
0
0
5
Q
1
 2
0
0
6
Q
1
 2
0
0
7
Q
1
 2
0
0
8
Q
1
 2
0
0
9
Q
1
 2
0
1
0
Q
1
 2
0
1
1
Q
1
 2
0
1
2
Q
1
 2
0
1
3
P(S(t)= 1)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Q
1
 1
9
8
8
Q
1
 1
9
8
9
Q
1
 1
9
9
0
Q
1
 1
9
9
1
Q
1
 1
9
9
2
Q
1
 1
9
9
3
Q
1
 1
9
9
4
Q
1
 1
9
9
5
Q
1
 1
9
9
6
Q
1
 1
9
9
7
Q
1
 1
9
9
8
Q
1
 1
9
9
9
Q
1
 2
0
0
0
Q
1
 2
0
0
1
Q
1
 2
0
0
2
Q
1
 2
0
0
3
Q
1
 2
0
0
4
Q
1
 2
0
0
5
Q
1
 2
0
0
6
Q
1
 2
0
0
7
Q
1
 2
0
0
8
Q
1
 2
0
0
9
Q
1
 2
0
1
0
Q
1
 2
0
1
1
Q
1
 2
0
1
2
Q
1
 2
0
1
3
P(S(t)= 2)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Q
1
 1
9
8
8
Q
1
 1
9
8
9
Q
1
 1
9
9
0
Q
1
 1
9
9
1
Q
1
 1
9
9
2
Q
1
 1
9
9
3
Q
1
 1
9
9
4
Q
1
 1
9
9
5
Q
1
 1
9
9
6
Q
1
 1
9
9
7
Q
1
 1
9
9
8
Q
1
 1
9
9
9
Q
1
 2
0
0
0
Q
1
 2
0
0
1
Q
1
 2
0
0
2
Q
1
 2
0
0
3
Q
1
 2
0
0
4
Q
1
 2
0
0
5
Q
1
 2
0
0
6
Q
1
 2
0
0
7
Q
1
 2
0
0
8
Q
1
 2
0
0
9
Q
1
 2
0
1
0
Q
1
 2
0
1
1
Q
1
 2
0
1
2
Q
1
 2
0
1
3
P(S(t)= 2)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Q
1
 1
9
8
8
Q
1
 1
9
8
9
Q
1
 1
9
9
0
Q
1
 1
9
9
1
Q
1
 1
9
9
2
Q
1
 1
9
9
3
Q
1
 1
9
9
4
Q
1
 1
9
9
5
Q
1
 1
9
9
6
Q
1
 1
9
9
7
Q
1
 1
9
9
8
Q
1
 1
9
9
9
Q
1
 2
0
0
0
Q
1
 2
0
0
1
Q
1
 2
0
0
2
Q
1
 2
0
0
3
Q
1
 2
0
0
4
Q
1
 2
0
0
5
Q
1
 2
0
0
6
Q
1
 2
0
0
7
Q
1
 2
0
0
8
Q
1
 2
0
0
9
Q
1
 2
0
1
0
Q
1
 2
0
1
1
Q
1
 2
0
1
2
Q
1
 2
0
1
3
P(S(t)= 1)
27 
 
Table 4. Government bond yield spread against Germany  
 
 Austria  Netherlands  
 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 
Debt -0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Budget balance -0.150*** 
(0.011) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
-0.051*** 
(0.011) 
Current account 0.075*** 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
Inflation 0.121 
(0.087) 
-0.058** 
(0.028) 
0.050 
(0.045) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
GDP growth -0.164*** 
(0.051) 
-0.039 
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.063) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
Unemployment 
 
0.096*** 
(0.027) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Real eff. exchange rate 0.040 
(0.041) 
-0.024 
(0.016) 
-0.046 
(0.030) 
-0.036*** 
(0.009) 
Risk factor 0.544*** 
(0.114) 
0.367*** 
(0.077) 
0.546*** 
(0.105) 
0.275*** 
(0.040) 
Observations 104  104  
Akaike info criteria -1.548  1.499  
Schwarz criterion -1.065  1.982  
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The coefficients for Austria and Netherlands are in many cases either insignificant or contradicting 
previous empirical research. The only estimated highly significant variable that also follows economic 
theory is the risk factor. This implies that the spread for these countries to a high degree was 
determined by global risk aversion at the time and not fiscal fundamentals. Although one should be 
very careful when drawing any conclusions from these results. 
Summary of results 
The empirical results for Spain and Italy are similar to results in previous studies and the estimated 
regime probabilities support the hypothesis of a nonlinear relationship between the sovereign risk 
premium and the macroeconomic variables. For the better performing northern European countries 
the estimated results are statistically not satisfying enough. Given that, it is possible to conclude that 
for countries with a mispriced yield spread between the euro introduction and the financial crisis 
(according to De Grauwe et al, 2012), the model is able to estimate rather reliable results. For 
countries without this mispricing and a very small yield spread, the model is not able to do that. 
Greece is obviously an exception because of its exclusion from the international bond market, 
resulting in an extremely large yield spread, and falsely reported financials. This makes the modelling 
of the Greek yield spread especially challenging. 
The statistically weak results for some of the countries make it inappropriate to draw too many 
general conclusions. The empirical study, however, is able to find evidence of two important findings 
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from previous research: first of all that the relationship between macroeconomic variables and the 
yield spread in Europe is nonlinear, as previously illustrated by e.g. Bernoth et al (2010) and Arghyrou 
et al (2011). This is proven by comparing linear models with nonlinear models. Second of all that the 
market’s interest in macro fundamentals when determining the sovereign risk premium is increasing 
in periods of financial instability, as argued by e.g. Schuknecht et al (2010) and De Grauwe et al 
(2012).  
An interesting difference between the north and the south, excluding Greece, is that fiscal 
fundamentals have a larger effect in the southern countries while the yield spread in the northern 
countries mainly depends on the global risk variable. Since the credit risk for the northern countries 
is considered very low, according to rating institutes, it is reasonable that these spreads mainly are 
determined by the global risk aversion. The higher credit risks in the south can possibly explain the 
large importance of fiscal variables. 
The results for the northern countries could be interpreted as a confirmation of the importance of 
the international risk aversion over fiscal variables, as argued by Barrios et al (2009) and Manganelli 
et al (2009). While the results for Spain and Italy are more in line with Bernoth et al (2010), showing a 
greater importance of macro variables. Given the low power of some of the tests, however, further 
studies are needed. 
5. Conclusion 
Since the financial crisis the volatility on the government bond market among euro countries has 
increased significantly. Peripheral countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain have seen their yield 
spread against German bonds go from almost zero in 2007 to an average around 900, 200 and 200 
basis points respectively. Much of recent research in the field of government bonds and its 
determinants are focusing on this period, from the euro introduction in 1999 until the sovereign debt 
crisis around 2012. Much of recent studies argue that the effect from economic variables has 
increased since the financial crisis in 2007. This behavior is a possible explanation for the change 
from converging yield spreads before the crisis to diverging during and after the crisis. A general 
finding from previous studies is that the relationship between the yield spread and economic 
variables are changing over time, especially between periods of financial stability and instability. This 
argues that the yield spreads in the eurozone follow a nonlinear model. 
These results are further studied in this paper. By using the Markov regime switching model it is 
possible to test if a nonlinear model can estimate the yield spread more efficiently than a linear. It is 
also possible to further analyze the change from low spreads before the crisis to high spreads after. 
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This sudden change can be interpreted as proof for different regimes: one during the low spread 
period and one before and after when the yield spread was high in comparison. The empirical study 
is conducted by using quarterly data from seven euro countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Netherlands and Spain) between 1988 and 2013. The data consists of several macroeconomic 
variables including a global risk variable. 
The statistical results are not satisfying enough to make any general conclusions. On a country 
specific level, however, it is possible to confirm the hypothesis of a specific regime during the period 
of low yield spread for Italy and Spain. The same conclusion was not possible to make for the 
northern countries, which can be explained by the fact that these countries yield spread has been 
very low even after the crisis. For these countries, the variable measuring global risk, seems to be the 
main determinant. It is also possible to find support for results from previous studies showing that 
the importance of economic variables increases during financial instability. Although the statistical 
power prevents us from declaring any strong confirmations. 
The use of a regime shifting model contributes to recent research by further analyzing how the 
relationship between economic variables and the risk premium changes over time. For further 
studies it would have been interesting to test this model on two other crisis countries, Ireland and 
Portugal, and compare with the results for Italy and Spain. These two countries had to be excluded 
because of missing forecast data. Other regime shifting models could also improve the knowledge of 
the sovereign risk premium. 
Finally, these results, and results from similar studies, should be of great interest for policy makers 
and politicians. It shows how the market penalizes countries with vulnerable macro figures during 
times of financial instability while other countries can benefit by gaining a safe haven status during 
these periods. The spread volatilities that we have seen among the EMU countries since the 80s is an 
obvious concern in a currency union. A possible solution that has been discussed lately, although far 
from being reality, is Eurobonds. These bonds would be issued jointly by all the countries in the 
eurozone, giving highly indebted countries a chance to borrow at better conditions. The possibilities 
of free riding are making these bonds very controversial however. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Description of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Yield spread 10 year government bond yield, 
differentiated by Germany. 
 
Thomson Reuter Datastream 
(Eurostat) 
Debt Gross government debt in % to GDP, 
differentiated by Germany. 
 
Thomson Reuter Datastream 
(Oxford Economics) 
Budget Balance Expected financial balance in % to GDP (1 
year forecast), differentiated by Germany. 
 
OECD World Economic Outlook 
Current account Current account in % to GDP, differentiated 
by Germany. 
 
OECD World Economic Outlook 
Inflation 
 
GDP deflator, differentiated by Germany. OECD World Economic Outlook 
GDP growth 
 
Change in annual GDP,differentiated by 
Germany. 
 
OECD World Economic Outlook 
Unemployment 
 
Unemployment, differentiated by Germany. 
 
OECD World Economic Outlook 
REER Real effective exchange rate in logarithms. 
 
Thomson Reuter Datastream (BIS) 
Risk factor Difference between US 10 year government 
bonds and US Baa corporate bonds 
Moody’s 
 
Table A2. Government bond yield spread against Germany (OLS)   
 Austria France Greece Italy Netherlands Spain 
Debt 0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.034*** 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.046) 
0.120*** 
(0.028) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
Budget balance -0.077*** 
(0.010 
-0.099** 
(0.044) 
-0.491** 
(0.195) 
-0.383*** 
(0.063) 
-0.054 
(0.013) 
-0.206** 
(0.088) 
Current account 0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.096) 
-0.111** 
(0.049) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.152*** 
(0.041) 
Inflation -0.022 
(0.038) 
0.415*** 
(0.089) 
-0.369 
(0.266) 
0.720*** 
(0.171) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
1.325*** 
(0.126) 
GDP growth -0.049 
(0.041) 
-0.548*** 
(0.152) 
-1.062** 
(0.456) 
-0.692*** 
(0.206) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
0.490** 
(0.174) 
Unemployment 
 
0.017 
(0.011) 
0.251*** 
(0.036) 
0.190 
(0.137) 
0.290*** 
(0.055) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.419*** 
(0.064) 
Real eff. exchange 
rate 
-0.025 
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.033) 
0.044 
(0.620) 
-1.835*** 
(0.396) 
-0.039 
(0.013) 
-0.928*** 
(0.152) 
Risk factor 0.519*** 
(0.054) 
0.395** 
(0.175) 
2.998 
(1.905) 
0.639 
(0.415) 
0.378 
(0.054) 
0.170 
(0.397) 
Observations  104 104 104 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.708 0.605 0.521 0.844 0.513 0.821 
Akaike info criteria -1.080 1.254 5.676 2.616 -1.186 2.786 
Schwarz criterion -0.997 1.457 5.879 2.820 -0.983 2.989 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A3. Greece government bond yield spread against Germany (3 regimes) 
 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Debt 0.855*** 
(0.089) 
-0.022 
(0.020) 
-0.029** 
(0.014) 
Budget balance 1.958* 
(1.051) 
-0.213 
(0.131) 
-0.337*** 
(0.048) 
Current account 1.428 
(0.880) 
-0.481*** 
(0.069) 
0.041* 
(0.023) 
Inflation 4.852*** 
(1.054) 
-0.041 
(0.176) 
-0.352*** 
(0.063) 
GDP growth -0.250 
(1.653) 
1.542*** 
(0.348) 
-1.011*** 
(0.111) 
Unemployment 
 
1.948** 
(0.823) 
0.541*** 
(0.125) 
0.053 
(0.035) 
Real eff. exchange rate 11.290*** 
(3.840) 
-0.060 
(0.245) 
0.765*** 
(0.188) 
Risk factor -88.961*** 
(25.323) 
6.557*** 
(1.948) 
1.655*** 
(0.432) 
Observations 104   
Akaike info criteria 3,820   
Schwarz criterion 4,506   
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure A1. Regime probabilities for Greece (3 regimes) 
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